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Abstract 
Successful monetization of user-generated-content (UGC) business calls for attracting enough users, 
and the right users. The defining characteristic of UGC is users are also content contributors. In this 
study, we analyze the impact of a UGC firm’s quality control decision on user community 
composition. We model two UGC firms in competition, with one permitting only high quality content 
while the other not controlling quality. Users differ in their valuations and the content quality they 
contribute. Through analyzing various equilibrium situations, we find that higher reward value 
generally benefits the firm without quality control. However, when the intrinsic value of contribution 
is low, higher reward value may surprisingly drive high valuation users away from that firm. Also 
somewhat interestingly, we find that higher cost of contribution may benefit the firm that does not 
control quality. Our work is among the first to study the business impact of quality control of UGC. 
Keywords:  User-generated-content, competition, network effect, quality, differentiation 
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Introduction 
In less than a decade, user-generated-content (UGC) based businesses have come from virtually nonexistent to 
becoming a mainstay phenomenon of Internet and E-Commerce (OECD 2007). UGC-based businesses exist in 
many forms: online social networks (MySpace, Facebook), content sharing sites (Youtube, Slashdot), blogs 
(Blogger.com, Technorati), virtual investment communities (SeekingAlpha, Motley Fool CAPS), etc. The highly 
priced sales of firms such as Youtube and MySpace, as well as Microsoft’s big ticket investment in Facebook, have 
all but ascertained the credibility of UGC-based business. Established businesses also try to leverage the power of 
UGC, as evidenced by many media websites’ decision to host user blogs, and novel features like CNN’s iReport. 
Though coming under the spotlight only recently, UGC has its root years ago. Business has always sought to 
leverage the contribution of users. Two widely studied examples are online reputation systems (Resnick et al. 2000) 
and open-source (Lerner and Tirole 2002). Major E-commerce sites such as Ebay and Amazon, in order to reduce 
information asymmetry, have established reputation systems where users evaluate each other and/or products (Bajari 
and Hortacsu 2003, Cabral and Hortacsu 2004). Open-source software firms also encourage community 
participation in the software development to reduce cost. Encouraging “high quality” user participation has been the 
theme of reputation systems (Dellarocas 2003) and open-source, as well as of UGC-based businesses in general 
(Chen et al. 2007). However, the current form of UGC-based businesses differs from a reputation system or open-
source on one crucial point: while for reputation systems and open-source, encouraging user participation is to help 
the business, for UGC-based businesses, user participation is the business. In open-source, for example, user 
participation helps build software products which firms can then sell for profit – firms profit from the products 
created by users, and user participation factors into firm profit indirectly. In a UGC-based business such as Youtube, 
however, participation makes users exposed to paid advertisements which bring profit to the firms – firms profit 
from users themselves, and user participation factors into firm profit directly. 
Many UGC firms are successful at attracting large communities of users. However, they are not nearly as successful 
monetizing the user bases. Even most popular firms such as Youtube and Facebook have struggled to profit (e.g. 
Reuters 2008). Many UGC business models have been proposed, with advertising and add-on selling among the 
most popular ones. But to date, successful monetization remains elusive (e.g. BusinessWeek 2007). Large user-base 
is crucial for success of UGC businesses. However, ample evidence also shows that this alone is not sufficient. All 
users are not the same. They differ in their valuation of service, and thus the profit they can bring to the firm. 
Attracting a large user-base is necessary, but attracting the right users, generally those who have higher valuation of 
service, is equally important. 
Existing research sheds light on understanding user’s motivation in contributing contents. Both intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors exist. Users may contribute to satisfy certain intrinsic need, such as the need to use open-source 
software (Shah 2006). Extrinsic factors may exist when users contribute to signal their abilities to interested parties, 
such as a developer signaling to potential employers her coding skills (Lerner and Tirole 2002). Furthermore, UGC 
firms may also provide monetary rewards to encourage user contribution, examples for which include Youtube’s 
plan to share advertising revenue with contributors (Helft 2007), or the million dollar portfolio challenge sponsored 
by CNBC (CNBC.com 2008). Intrinsic and extrinsic factors differ in from one important perspective: while the 
former is determined by the user herself, the latter is also influenced by the participation of other users (for example, 
when more users participate, the chance of each individual user winning the CNBC’s portfolio challenge is reduced).   
The quality of content generated by users is a major concern to UGC firms (Chen et al. 2007). In reputation systems, 
firms have tried numerous ways to elicit honest opinion, combating potential adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Dellarocas 2005). In open-source software, meritocracy is commonly adopted to ensure product quality. In UGC 
businesses in general, quality control mechanisms vary in both format and strictness. Some quality control is people-
based, such as in SeekingAlpha, which certifies contributors before their contribution can be accepted. Some is 
actively content-based, such as in Slashdot, which has experts review user submission to decide whether to publish. 
Some is passively content-based, such as in Youtube, which removes published content that it later finds as 
inappropriate. Some firms also do not control quality at all. 
When UGC functions such as reputation systems are used to facilitate other businesses such as online retailing, 
maximizing content quality is desirable. However, today’s UGC based firms are not there to help another business. 
Instead, they are the business. Most of these firms do not profit from their contents, but from their users. In this 
context, it is questionable whether higher quality always helps firms. 
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The defining characteristic of a UGC-based business is that users can also be contributors. Therefore, they can be 
differentiated along both the consumption and the production dimension. On the consumption dimension, users 
value the UGC platform based on both the information they can get from the platform and the extent of their own 
contribution to the platform. On the production dimension, users differ in the quality of the content they can 
contribute. Advertising based UGC business models call for attracting not just more users, but also more users who 
have high valuation in the consumption dimension. Those with high valuation, however, may not all have the ability 
to contribute high quality content, an attribute in the production dimension. Separating users based on these two 
dimensions gives us four groups: those who have high(low) valuation in the consumption dimension and can 
contribute high(low) quality content in the production dimension.  
Increasing content quality through quality control mechanisms runs the risk of driving away certain types of users, 
whose participation also influences the participation of other types of users. This effect is not obvious to see, but 
very important for firms to understand. This motivates our study, where the central question is the impact of UGC 
firm’s quality control decision on the participation decision by different users. This question has important 
managerial implications, as the size and composition of the user base directly impacts firm profit. Factors such as 
the cost of contribution, magnitude of extrinsic reward, dispersion of content quality, and difference in valuation, 
would interact with the quality control decision to influence user participation, and their effects are studied.  
By studying two UGC platforms with different quality control policies in competition, one allowing anyone to 
contribute while the other permitting only high quality contents, we characterize the equilibrium under different 
situations. We show that higher reward value generally benefit the platform that does not control quality, because 
more users will contribute in the other platform and the per person reward value is lower there. A key insight of our 
study is that the relative cost of the users with low and high valuation determines which type will respond to the 
reward value and choose the platform that does not control quality. We show that because the relative cost of users 
change as the reward value changes, higher reward value may bring more low valuation users to the platform that 
does not control quality while at the same time drive the high valuation users out. We also show that though higher 
cost of contribution is generally detrimental to the platform which does not control quality, it can also benefit that 
platform under certain circumstances, again because of the change of this relative cost. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review related literature. The following section 
describes the model used in our study. Equilibrium scenarios and their implications are discussed in detail 
subsequently. And finally we conclude. 
Literature Review 
Academic research on UGC is still growing. The research can be grounded on several stream of work in economic 
theories. Demonstrated in many UGC communities are various forms of network externalities, either positive or 
negative, which have a rich related economic literature (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1985). As is detailed below, our 
study recognizes a form of negative externality, since users compete for the reward value in UGC platforms. UGC 
community has similar structure to a platform or two-sided market (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Parker and Van Alstyne 
2005) through which users both create and consume content, or information. The difference is that whereas in a two-
sided market producers and consumers are two distinct groups, in UGC communities they are the same group of 
users that cannot be separated ex ante. The existence of consumer heterogeneity is long recognized in economic 
research and differentiation strategies have been studied extensively (Shaked and Sutton 1983, Vandenbosch and 
Weinberg 1995). The differentiation in our study is unique in that each of the users is potentially both a producer 
and a consumer, and they are differentiated along both dimensions. Information asymmetry is also studied in 
economic research (Akerlof 1970), and is related to us in that, first, signaling skills (Spence 1973) may be one of the 
reasons that users contribute in UGC platforms, and second, that UGC firms cannot tell the types of users restricts 
their ability to attract the profitable ones. 
A rich literature exists on two special forms of UGC, namely open-source and online reputation systems, that are 
used in assisting product development and electronic-commerce. In the case of open-source, the “content” generated 
by users are the computer program that comprise the software products which are used by users and other people. 
Three categories of open-source research exist: motivation for contributions, governance of open-source initiatives, 
and competitive dynamics (von Krogh and von Hippel 2006). Closely related to our study is the first stream of work 
(e.g. Roberts et al. 2006, Shah 2006), which studies incentive to voluntarily contribute to open-source projects. 
Roberts et al. (2006) finds through investigating the Apache project that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 
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exist for users to contribute. While Shah (2006) finds that a developer’s contribution is often first driven by her need 
to use the software, and the contribution gradually evolves into a hobby. Contributing to online communities can be 
considered as a form of private provision of public goods, which has a long literature in the economics community 
(Olson 1965, Andreoni 1988). This view is also empirically tested and confirmed using data acquired from 
Wikipedia. (Zhang and Zhu 2007). 
The emergence of online communities enabled the creation of online reputation systems (Resnick et al. 2000), which 
can be used to reduce information asymmetry in online communities. Dellarocas (2003) provides a comprehensive 
survey on research related to reputation systems and the corresponding design challenges. Similarly, Dellarocas 
(2005) investigates reputation system design in pure moral hazard settings.  
The existence of different types of users and the effect of content quantity and quality on their participation in online 
communities are already recognized in literature. Gu et al. (2007) hypothesize that users differ in demand for quality 
and information processing cost, and through empirical analysis of several virtual investment communities, find that 
the communities engage in differentiation based on the tradeoff of quality and quantity. Our study bears similarity to 
Gu et al. (2007) as we both account for user types and information quality, but our study is different, in that Gu et al. 
(2007) empirically verify the effect of content volume on information quality but do not consider the quality control 
decision, while we analyze the effect of quality control decision on content quality and the participation of different 
types of users.  
Controlling content quality in online communities has also been studied. Chen et al. (2007) investigates the effect of 
moderation and reputation systems in online communities. They find that moderation in general improves 
information quality, but the strategic reaction from contributors may actually reduce the quality of contribution in 
certain stage of the dynamic process. Not considered in that paper, though, is the participation decision of different 
types of users. Ren and Kraut (2007) build an agent-based model to study the moderation mechanisms in online 
communities, and find that personalized moderation is more effective than community-level moderation in 
increasing contribution. Lampe and Resnick (2004) investigate the feasibility of distributed moderation performed 
by users themselves in online communities. Other work also studies the factors that influence the effectiveness of 
blog advertising (Zhu and Tan 2007), and the effect of the volume of online product review on sales (Etzion and 
Awad 2007). 
The Model 
We study how UGC platforms with or without quality control attract user participation. There are two firms in our 
model, each providing a UGC platform where users can view and contribute content. Contents, contributed by users, 
are of either high quality, 
Hq , or low quality, Lq , where LH qq > . The quality dimension is vertical in that all users 
prefer high over low quality content, though maybe to different degrees.  
Firms differ in their quality control practice. Firm 1, subsequently referred to as the “qualifying” firm, or simply the 
Q platform, controls quality by allowing only high quality content to be contributed. Firm 2, subsequently referred 
to as the “not-qualifying” firm, or simply as the NQ platform, does not control quality, allowing both high and low 
quality contributions. In real-world, firms leverage a variety of quality control mechanisms. Some imposes a high 
standard, such as qualifying the contributor before accepting any of her articles, or actively inspecting each article 
before deciding whether to publish; some imposes lower standard, such as removing articles which some readers 
complain about; some “outsource” the control to readers, such as by asking readers to rate an article and sorting 
article based on their ratings. Since our focus is the quality control decision itself, we make the simplifying 
assumption that when a firm controls quality, it does so strictly by permitting only high quality content. The optimal 
level of quality control can be studied in an extended model, which we leave for future work. 
There are a group of users, the mass of which is normalized to 1. Each user chooses to join the platform provided by 
one of the firms. In the platform, she can participate in one of two ways. First, she can be a read-only user (or be 
forced to). Second, she can be a reader as well as contributor. Users differ in two orthogonal dimensions: the 
consumption dimension, which characterizes their valuation of the read and write service provided by the platform, 
and the production dimension, which characterizes the quality of the content they contribute to the platform. On the 
consumption dimension, a user has either high valuation H  or a low valuation L  of service. On the production 
dimension, a user can create content of either high quality 
Hq  or low quality Lq . We assume that half of the users 
have high valuation of service, and half have low valuation. We also assume that a portion α , )2/1 ,0(∈α  of 
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users can contribute high quality content, and the rest can contribute low quality content. There are two reasons for 
the assumptions that more people can contribute low quality contents than can contribute high quality ones. First, 
being high quality means it is not easy to be created. And second, it is perceived that typically user generated 
contents have relatively low quality. There are thus four types of users, which we denote as type 
},{},,{ , HLjHLiij ∈∈ , where i  represents the type in the consumption dimension and j  the type in the 
production dimension (for example, a user of type LH has low valuation of service but can create high quality 
content).  
A user derives value from both reading the content and, provided she contributes, writing contents. The net value 
derived from reading is a function of user’s valuation type and the content quality she reads
1
:  
jijr qqiV θ=),(  
In the equation, },{},,{ HLjHLi ∈∈ . We assume that when reading, users come across content randomly that 
exist in the UGC platform. Assuming users are risk neutral, the expected value from reading on the UGC platform 
with average quality 
avgq  is thus: 
avgir qiV θ=)(  
Only users who contribute derive the writing value, which contains two elements. First, contribution satisfies certain 
intrinsic needs, such as expressing an opinion or interacting with other users. Second, contribution may bring 
extrinsic reward value to the contributor, through signaling the contributor’s ability, being paid for contribution, etc. 
The intrinsic value depends on the user’s valuation of service. We assume that the intrinsic value derived by high 
valuation users, denoted as 
Hv , is higher than that derived by low valuation users, denoted as Lv . The extrinsic 
reward value, meanwhile, depends not only on user’s type in the production dimension but also other people who 
contribute in the same UGC platform. We expect the reward value to be higher for contributors who can contribute 
higher quality content, and expect the value to be negatively correlated with the number of contributors (the more 
users contribute, the less chance a particular user gets noticed or wins a reward). Users incur a cost 
wc  when 
contributing. To make the difference among the users material, we assume that only users who contribute high 
quality content can derive the reward value, and that 
HwL vcv <<  (so only high valuation users would contribute if 






),( +−=  
for users who can contribute high quality content and 
wiw cvLiV −=),(  
for users who contribute low quality content. 
In the equation, S  is the total reward value endowed to the UGC platform and 
H#  is the mass of users who 
contribute high quality content in the platform. In real world, this endowed reward value can come in many forms, 
such as the UGC firm offering prize to certain highly ranked users, or potential employers going through the 
platform looking for the top performers. In either case, it is expected that the more people contribute, the lower this 
reward value to each individual contributor.  
Table 1 lists and describes all the parameters of the model. Note that certain symbols, such as 
avgq  or H# , are used 
to denote characteristics of interest but are derived values instead of exogenous model parameters (e.g. 
avgq , the 
average platform quality, is determined by how many users of each type contribute to the platform in equilibrium).  
The type of users and their utility functions are summarized in figure 1. 
                                                          
1
 The cost of reading is normalized to zero in this model, because we focus on the impact of different quality control 
decisions and do not ex ante assume a lower cost of reading (e.g. arising from superior design of user interface) for 
either platform. The model can be easily extended to handle positive reading cost. 
Economics and Information Systems 
 
6 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix, Arizona 2009 
Table 1. Parameters of the Model 
Parameter Description 
Hq , Lq  Content quality (high or low) 
Hθ , Lθ  Valuation of quality (high or low) 
Hv , Lv  
Intrinsic value of contribution (high or low) 
wc  
Cost of writing 
S  Reward value endowed to the platform 
α  Portion of users who can contribute high quality content 
 
One assumption made in our study is that a high valuation user values both reading (content quality) and writing 
(intrinsic contribution value) higher than a user with low valuation. We believe this is a reasonable assumption, as 
the valuation is the characteristic of a user on the consumption dimension, rather than of a specific activity such as 
reading or writing. From another perspective, if a user has different valuations on reading and writing, then it would 
be unclear how she values the add-on products that the UGC platform is selling or carrying advertisement for, i.e., 
her profitability to the firm is ambiguous. In this case, not much can be said about the implication of gaining or 
losing such a user. Another point to note is that we consider the cases where a user can be read-only or read-write, 
but not write-only. This is not itself an assumption, but comes directly from our model setup where all users derive 
positive net utility from reading (the cost of reading is normalized to zero). Extension can be made to consider the 
case with significant information processing cost. However, we do not expect this to materially change the result, 
since the relative attractiveness of the two platforms is unlikely to change when an outside option of not using either 











scvqu wLavgLw +−+= θ
avgHr
qu θ=






Figure 1.  User types and utility functions 
Equilibrium Analysis 
Our study uses the game theoretic approach to account for the optimizing behavior of agents and their strategic 
interaction in an integrated setting. In the UGC platform choice game, each user chooses the platform and the type 
of participation to maximize her own utility
2
. An equilibrium is characterized by user distribution between the two 
                                                          
2
 We allow each user to choose only one platform in the game. Although in real world a user can theoretically use 
multiple platforms, there is usually considerable adoption cost in using each platform, in the form of subscription fee, 
learning cost, etc. A user in the model can be interpreted as an individual visit by a user in the real-world, and only 
one platform can be visited each time. 
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platforms, where no user can increase her utility by unilaterally choosing the other platform or a different 
participation type. This user distribution has significant impact on UGC firm profits as it influences the willingness-
to-pay of advertisers for each platform. Understanding the various equilibrium scenarios is thus critical to decision 
makers.  
Characteristics of Equilibria 
Each individual user chooses the platform and the type of participation that maximizes her utility. In doing so, she 
may face a tradeoff between the value derived from reading and that from writing. Since the qualifying platform 
permits only high quality content while the not-qualifying one allows both quality levels, the average content quality 
of the qualifying platform is likely higher than that of the not-qualifying platform. Therefore, a user may derive 
higher value from reading when using the qualifying platform. However, if the user can contribute only low quality 
content, then to use the qualifying platform she would have to give up the value from contributing content. If the 
user can create high quality content, she could contribute in either platform and derive the intrinsic value from 
contribution, but she may still derive lower reward value if she uses the qualifying platform if there are more high 
quality contributors in that platform. 
As will be shown in the following sections, the equilibrium scenarios vary according to factors such as content 
quality and cost of contribution. Nonetheless, these equilibria share some common characteristics, which are 
determined by the fundamental structure of the game. We summarize these characteristics in the proposition below 
and discuss them subsequently. 
Proposition 1: All following properties hold in any equilibrium of the UGC platform choice game: 
1.1 Both platforms attract strictly positive number of users 
1.2 At least a portion of the type LH or HH users will contribute in the NQ  platform. 
1.3 
NQQ qq > . 
1.4 All type LL users will choose the qualifying platform and only read. 
1.5 At least a portion of type HL users will choose to contribute in the NQ platform. 
1.6 All type HL and LH users who choose the NQ platform will contribute there. 
1.7 All type HH users will contribute regardless of which platform they choose. 
1.8 
QNQ ss > , where Is  is the reward value derived by each individual user who contributes high quality 
content in platform },{ , NQQII ∈ . 
1.9 If any type LH user chooses to contribute in the Q platform, all type HH users will contribute in the Q 
platform.  
If either platform attracts all users, then any LH or HH user can move to the other platform and derive large reward 
value. Such a scenario thus cannot be an equilibrium (thus property 1.1 holds). Furthermore, it shows that in an 
equilibrium both platforms will have some users contributing high quality content in them (thus property 1.2 holds). 
Since the Q platform permits only high quality content, we certainly have 
NQQ qq ≥ . To have the equality hold, no 
type HL user can contribute in the NQ platform. But if that is the case, then a type HL user can increase her utility by 
choosing to contribute in the NQ platform, since she now derives additional positive utility from contributing 
without sacrificing any utility from reading. Thus a scenario like this cannot be an equilibrium (thus property 1.3 
holds).  
In an equilibrium, type LL users will not contribute, since doing so will result in negative intrinsic value from 
writing and no reward value. Given 1.3, then, this type of user must be in the qualifying platform to sustain the 
equilibrium (thus property 1.4 holds). 
Given property 1.4, if no type HL user contributes in NQ platform, then 
HQNQ qqq == . From property 1.3, we 
know this cannot be an equilibrium (thus property 1.5 holds). Given property 1.3, if any type LH or HL user chooses 
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the NQ platform but does not contribute there, then she can increase her utility by moving to the qualifying platform 
as a read-only user. A scenario like this thus cannot be an equilibrium (thus property 1.6 holds).  
Regardless of the platform she chooses, a type HH user can derive higher utility contributing than if she only reads 
(thus property 1.7 holds). 
Given property 1.2, some type LH or HH users will contribute in the NQ platform. If 
QNQ ss = , then given property 
1.3, any of these users can increase her utility by contributing in the qualifying platform. This cannot be a 
equilibrium (thus property 1.8 holds). 
Finally, if any LH user contributes in qualifying platform but not all HH users contribute there, we must have some 
HH contribute in the NQ platform per property 1.7. To sustain this as an equilibrium, then, we must have 
QHHNQNQH sqsq +≥+ θθ , i.e. an HH user derives higher value from  the NQ platform. However, this implies that 
)()( NQHLNQHHQNQ qqqqss −>−≥− θθ , so any LH user who contributes in qualifying platform can increase her 
utility by moving to the NQ platform and contribute there. Such a scenario thus cannot be sustained as a equilibrium 
(thus property 1.9 holds). 
Property 1.9 is the first glimpse of the interactions between users of types LH and HH. As we can see, the reason 
property 1.9 holds is that type LH users are in a sense cheaper (less costly) than type HH users, making them easier 
to be attracted to the NQ platform. This LH being cheaper is because of their relatively lower sensitivity to quality 
degradation (
HL θθ < ). This holds for sure, however, only when LH would contribute in qualifying platform, to 
sustain which the reward value must be significant enough to compensate the net intrinsic disutility of contributing 
of this type of user.  
In the following sections, we analyze separately the scenarios where the intrinsic value of contributing is high 
relative to the quality difference, and where the intrinsic value is low. The difference between these two cases can be 
clearly seen if we ignore the reward value: absent reward value, all HL users will choose the NQ platform in the 
former scenario, while they will all choose the Q platform in the latter. We show below that as the reward value 
increases progressively, the contribution decision of LH and HH users evolve in similar ways between the two cases, 
though only in the latter case does their contribution influence the decision of HL users.   
Equilibria under High Contribution Value 
In this section, we study the scenario where )( LHHwH qqcv −≥− θ . This is described as the high contribution 
value case, because the intrinsic value of contribution for a high valuation user outweighs the quality difference. As 
a result, all HL users will choose to contribute in the NQ platform regardless of the decisions of other users: even if 
no LH or HH user contributes in the NQ platform, the net intrinsic contribution value that a HL user can gain by 
moving to NQ platform, 
wH cv − , is still higher than the reduction of the value of reading arising from choosing the 
platform with low content quality, )( LHH qq −θ .  
It is shown in the previous section that all LL users will choose the Q platform. The question that remains is which 
platform LH and HH users will choose. Due to the presence of reward value, a portion of them will choose the NQ 
platform. When an LH user chooses the Q platform, she gets reading value 
HLqθ  and, if she chooses to contribute, 
reward value 
Qs  while incurring a net cost of contribution Lw vc − . Her utility from choosing the Q platform is thus 
)}(,0max{ LwQHL vcsq −−+θ . When she chooses the NQ platform, her reading value is reduced to NQLqθ . In return, 
she gets reward value 
NQs  while incurring the net contribution cost Lw vc − . Therefore, to an LH user, the NQ 
platform will be more attractive than the Q platform, if we have: 
)}(,0max{)( LwQHLLwNQNQL vcsqvcsq −−+>−−+ θθ   (1) 
An HH user faces a similar tradeoff, but the situation is simpler in that she for sure will contribute. To an HH user, 
NQ will be more attractive if: 
QHLNQNQH sqsq +≥+ θθ       (2) 
 Ma et. al. / Quality Control and UGC Monetization 
 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix, Arizona 2009 9 
To better understand the tradeoff, we could first consider that the users are in the Q platform, and then think of the 
cost incurred by a user when moving from the Q platform to the NQ platform. This cost must be compensated by the 
reward value. From (1), the cost to an LH user is },max{)( QLwNQHL svcqq −+−θ , and from (2), the cost to an HH 
user is 
QNQHH sqq +− )(θ . If an LH user incurs a lower cost than an HH user, then some LH users will choose the 
NQ platform first; if the cost of an HH user is lower, then some HH users will do so first; and if the costs are close, 
both types may see a portion of them choose the NQ platform. 
This cost to an LH or HH user, however, is not a constant. It certainly depends on the overall reward value S  that is 
endowed to each platform. In addition, it also depends on the decisions of other users, which influence the average 
content quality as well as the per-person reward value.  
The equilibrium situation crucially depends on the magnitude of the reward value. To help understand the equilibria 
corresponding to different values of these exogenous factors, we could first consider the case that the overall reward 
value S  is close to zero, and consider how the equilibrium evolves as increases
3
. In the following, we discuss 
separately the scenario where the cost to LH users is “initially” lower, and the scenario where the cost to HH users is 
initially lower. By initially, we mean when S  is close to zero. In this case, the costs are largely determined by the 
net contribution cost of LH users and the reading value of HH users, i.e. 
Lw vc −  vs. ))(( LHLH qq −−θθ .  




Proposition 2: If )( LHHwH qqcv −≥− θ  and ))(( LHLHLw qqvc −−<− θθ , then the game has a unique pure 
strategy equilibrium, in which: 
o All LL and HH users choose the Q platform 
o All HL users choose the NQ platform 
o LH users split between the two platforms. Those who choose the NQ platform will contribute there. If 
)ˆ,0( 1
HLSS∈ , those who choose the Q platform will not contribute; if )ˆ,ˆ[ 21
HLHL
SSS∈ , a portion of those 
who choose the Q platform will contribute; and if ),ˆ[ 2 ∞∈
HLSS , all those who choose the Q platform 
will contribute. The two delimiting values are: 
2/)(ˆ1 Lw
HL vcS −= α , and HLS2ˆ  solves the following system of equations together with x , the portion of 















Corollary 2: When )( LHHwH qqcv −≥− θ  and ))(( LHLHLw qqvc −−<− θθ , the higher the reward value S , 
the more LH users, and in turn total users, choose the NQ platform. 
As shown in Proposition 2 and will be in the following propositions, the equilibrium situation depends on factors 
including content quality difference, valuation difference, and the magnitude of the reward value. To help compare 
these equilibria, consider the equilibrium as it evolves along the dimension of reward value, with other factors fixed. 
Initially when there is no reward value, i.e. 0=S , all LH and HH users choose the Q platform, with the former read-
only and the latter contributing. When reward value becomes positive, even if very small,  i.e. 0>= εS , certain LH 
or HH user will move to the NQ platform in the equilibrium. In this case, since an LH user is cheaper, i.e. has lower 
cost, than an HH user, LH users will move and HH users will remain in the Q platform. As S  increases, more LH 
                                                          
3
 It is important to keep in mind that the games are static. Although the discussion in the text uses words such as 
“initially”, “evolve”, or “move”, it is only to give the insight on how the equilibrium changes when exogenous 
factors change. That is, it is comparing the equilibria of different games (each game indexed by a specific parameter 
value). Each individual game is static, however, in that all users make decisions once simultaneously. 
4
 Due to page limit, detailed proofs of the propositions are omitted. They are available from authors upon request. 
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users will move to the NQ platform, and the per-person reward value in both platforms increase. When S  crosses a 
certain threshold, HLS1
ˆ , a portion of the LH users in Q platform also find it worthwhile to contribute there. This 
portion also increases as S  goes up further. When S  crosses the second threshold, HLS2
ˆ , all LH users in the Q 
platform will contribute. 
More relevant to a decision maker is the knowledge that higher reward value increases the number of users who 
choose the NQ platform. This may not be obvious at first, since both platforms have the same reward value 
endowed. But it is not difficult to understand. Since the Q platform has higher content quality, naturally more LH 
and HH users will choose it. An equal increase in the overall reward value of each platform thus translates to a 
higher increase in the per-person reward value for the NQ platform than the Q platform. Thus as the overall reward 
value increases, more users will be attracted to the NQ platform. 
The case where HH users initially have lower cost is specified in proposition 3 and discussed subsequently. It bears 
considerable similarity with the above case, though significant difference also exists. 
Proposition 3: If )( LHHwH qqcv −≥− θ  and ))(( LHLHLw qqvc −−≥− θθ , then the game has a unique pure 
strategy equilibrium, in which: 
o All LL users choose the Q platform 
o All HL users choose the NQ platform 
o If )ˆ,0( 1
HHSS∈ , HH users split between the two platforms. All LH users choose the Q platform and 

























And the threshold value HHS1























o If )ˆ,ˆ[ 21
HHHH SSS∈ , both HH and LH users split between the two platforms. The portion of HH users 




















































And the threshold value HHS2















































o If ),ˆ[ 2 ∞∈
HHSS , all HH users choose the Q platform, and LH users split between the two platforms. 
Among those LH users who choose the Q platform, if )ˆ,ˆ[ 212
HHHH
SSS∈ , none of them will contribute; if 
)ˆ,ˆ[ 2221
HHHH SSS∈ , a portion of them will contribute; and if ),ˆ[ 22 ∞∈
HH
SS , all of them will contribute 
there. The two delimiting values are: 
2/)(ˆ21 Lw
HH vcS −= α , and HHS22ˆ  solves the following system of equations together with x , the portion of 
LH users who choose the NQ platform: 
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Corollary 3.1: When )( LHHwH qqcv −≥− θ  and ))(( LHLHLw qqvc −−≥− θθ , the higher the reward value 
S , the more users overall choose the NQ platform. 
Corollary 3.2: When )( LHHwH qqcv −≥− θ  and ))(( LHLHLw qqvc −−≥− θθ , if )ˆ,ˆ[ 21
HHHH
SSS∈ , the higher 
the reward value S , the fewer HH users choose the NQ platform. 
Again, consider the equilibrium situation as evolving along the reward value dimension. This time some HH users 
will first respond to a small reward value by moving to the NQ platform. This is because initially HH users are 
cheaper, i.e. have lower cost: 
LwLHLH vcqq −≤−− ))(( θθ . As reward value increases, more HH users will be 
attracted to the NQ platform, similar to the case where LH users are cheaper. 
However, a significant difference exists between the two cases. While in the case where LH users are initially 
cheaper, LH remains cheaper as the reward value increases, in the case where HH users are initially cheaper, HH 
users do not stay that way. As the overall reward value increases, the per-person reward value in the Q platform, 
Qs , 
increases as well. This increases the cost to an HH user. The cost to an LH user is not increased, however, because 
LH users will not contribute in the Q platform and is indifferent (at least when S  is small) to this change of 
Qs . The 
gap between the two costs therefore gets smaller as S  increases. When S  crosses the threshold value HHS1
ˆ ,  HH 
users are no longer strictly cheaper, and a portion of LH users and a portion of HH users will both choose the NQ 
platform. Between threshold values HHS1
ˆ  and HHS2
ˆ , as S  increases, more LH users will choose the NQ platform. At 
the same time, however, fewer HH users will do so. In another word, HH users are crowded out by LH users as S  
increases. When S  increases beyond the threshold value HHS2
ˆ , LH becomes cheaper than HH users, so only a 
portion of LH users will choose the NQ platform, while all HH users will stay in the Q platform. After this, the 
situation is similar to that where LH users are initially cheaper: the LH users who choose the Q platform will first 
only read; when S  crosses the threshold HHS21
ˆ , a portion of them will begin to contribute; and when S  finally 
crosses the threshold HHS22
ˆ , all LH users who choose the Q platform will contribute there. 
The finding that fewer HH users choose the NQ platform as S  increases between HHS1
ˆ  and HHS2
ˆ  both is surprising 
and has important managerial implications. As we have discussed, the number of users choosing the NQ platform 
increases as the overall reward value S  goes up, and this phenomenon is relatively easy to understand. However, it 
is not easy to see that though the total number of users increases, the number of HH users actually decreases. The 
key insight behind this is the relative cost of LH and HH users: as the reward value increases, HH users become 
more and more expensive to attract, and are crowded out of the NQ platform by LH users. This is probably not what 
the NQ firm wants to see. HH users have higher valuation than LH users, and would be more profitable to the firm
5
. 
In the case where the reward value can be influenced by the firm, then, the NQ firm should be cautious about 
increasing this value. Though higher reward value attracts more users, it may attract the wrong users to the platform. 
Equilibria under Low Contribution Value 
In this section, we study the scenario where )( LHHwH qqcv −<− θ . This is described as the low contribution value 
case, because in contrast to the previous section, the intrinsic value of contribution for a high valuation user here 
does not automatically outweigh the quality difference. In fact, if no LH or HH user contributes in the NQ platform, 
then all HL users will choose the Q platform, forgoing their permission to contribute in the NQ platform. 
                                                          
5
 Suppose that a product firm is advertising on the UGC platform. A high-valuation user will be more interested in 
the product, so the firm is willing to pay more for the advertisement when more high-valuation users use the 
platform. A complete profit analysis with advertisers as players of the game is a topic for future research. 
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Due to the presence of reward value, some LH or HH users will contribute in the NQ platform. This will help attract 
some of the HL users to the NQ platform as well, (consider this: the “first” HL user who chooses the NQ platform 
does not sacrifice any reading value in doing so, for the average content quality in NQ, before she joins, is also 
Hq ).  
In the discussion that follows, we focus on the situation where only a portion of HL users will choose NQ platform
6
. 
(The case where all HL users may choose NQ platform is similar to the case of high contribution value studied in the 
previous section, the analysis of which does not offer additional insights.) 
Proposition 4: If )( LHHwH qqcv −<− θ  and HWHLHLw cvvc θθθ /))(( −−<− , then the game has a unique 
pure strategy equilibrium, in which: 
o All LL and HH users choose the Q platform 
o HL users split between the two platforms.  
o LH users split between the two platforms. Those who choose the NQ platform will contribute there. If 
)ˆ,0( 1
LLSS∈ , those who choose the Q platform will not contribute; if )ˆ,ˆ[ 21
LLLL
SSS ∈ , a portion of those 
who choose the Q platform will contribute; and if ),ˆ[ 2 ∞∈
LLSS , all those who choose Q platform will 
contribute there. The two delimiting values are: 
2/)(ˆ1 Lw
LL vcS −= α , and LLS2ˆ  solves the following system of equations together with x , the portion of 















o HL users split between the two platforms. The portion of HL users who choose the NQ platform is 













Corollary 4: When )( LHHwH qqcv −<− θ  and HWHLHLw cvvc θθθ /))(( −−<− , the higher the reward 
value S , the more LH users, and in turn total users, choose the NQ platform. 
Proposition 5: If )( LHHwH qqcv −<− θ  and HWHLHLw cvvc θθθ /))(( −−≥− , then the game has a unique 
pure strategy equilibrium, in which: 
o All LL users choose the Q platform 
o If )ˆ,0( 1
LHSS∈ , HH users split between the two platforms. All LH users choose the Q platform and 













And the threshold value HHS1
















o If )ˆ,ˆ[ 21
LHLH SSS∈ , both HH and LH users split between the two platforms. The portion of HH users that 
choose the NQ platform, )(SxHH , and the portion of LH users that do so, )(SxLH , satisfy: 
                                                          
6








θ . In this case, that all HL users 
choose the NQ platform cannot be an equilibrium, because any HL user in that situation can gain by deviating to the 
Q platform. 
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And the threshold value LHS2


























o If ),ˆ[ 2 ∞∈
LHSS , all HH users choose the Q platform, and LH users split between the two platforms. 
Among those LH users who choose the Q platform, if )ˆ,ˆ[ 212
LHLH
SSS∈ , none of them will contribute; if 
)ˆ,ˆ[ 2221
LHLH SSS∈ , a portion of them will contribute; and if ),ˆ[ 22 ∞∈
LH
SS , all of them will contribute there. 
The two delimiting values are: 
2/)(ˆ21 Lw
LH vcS −= α , and LHS22ˆ  solves the following system of equations together with x , the portion of 





























o HL users split between the two platforms. The portion of HL users who choose the NQ platform is 













Corollary 5.1: When )( LHHwH qqcv −<− θ  and HWHLHLw cvvc θθθ /))(( −−≥− , the higher the reward 
value S , the more HL and LH users choose the NQ platform. 
Corollary 5.2: When )( LHHwH qqcv −<− θ  and HWHLHLw cvvc θθθ /))(( −−≥− , if )ˆ,ˆ[ 21
LHLH
SSS∈ , the 
higher the reward value S , the fewer HH users choose the NQ platform. Meanwhile, more HL users will 
choose the NQ platform. The increase in the number of HL users may be either higher or lower than the 
decrease of the HH users. 
The case of low contribution value bears similarity to the case of high contribution value discussed earlier. In both 
cases, a portion of either LH or HH users will initially choose the NQ platform depending on which have lower cost. 
In both cases, if LH users are initially cheaper, they will stay that way as the reward value increases, yet if HH users 
are initially cheaper, they will become more expensive as the reward value increases, and be crowded out 
eventually. Therefore, combining this propositions in this section with those in the previous section, we know that 
the results that higher reward value normally benefits the NQ platform, yet in certain situations may crowd out high 
valuation users from the NQ platform, hold with considerable generality. 
The case of low contribution value differs from the high contribution value case in terms of HL users, however. In 
the case of high contribution value, the intrinsic contribution value alone is high enough to attract HL users to the 
NQ platform, regardless of the decisions of other users. In the case of low contribution value, however, HL users 
will not choose the NQ platform unless some of the LH or HH users would choose to contribute high quality content 
there. Moreover, the more LH and HH users choose the NQ platform, the more HL users will choose it. From the 
firm’s perspective, this amplifies the effect of reward value to make it benefit the NQ platform more than it does in 
the case of high contribution value. Meanwhile, it also moderates the crowding out effect should it exist: even 
though HH users are crowded out of the NQ platform when reward value increases, the combined number of LH and 
HH users increases, which in turn increases the number of HL users, who are also high valuation users. This increase 
in HL users may more than offset the decrease of HH users, making higher reward value always beneficial to the NQ 
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platform. As shown in proposition 5, the higher the value of γ , the more HL users will be attracted to the NQ 
platform per LH or HH user there. Therefore, the closer the net intrinsic contribution value (
wH cv − ) to the 
difference in content quality valuation ( )( LHH qq −θ ), the more easily HL users will be attracted to the NQ 
platform. 
The Role of the Cost-of-Contribution 
In addition to the reward value, the cost of contribution, 
wc , also has significant impact on the equilibrium situations 
and warrants closer scrutiny. From user’s perspective, the Q platform is attractive because of its higher content 
quality, while the NQ platform may be attractive because of the freedom to contribute. Since a higher 
wc  reduces the 
net intrinsic utility of contribution, one would expect that higher 
wc  reduces the appeal of the NQ platform and 
benefits the Q platform. However, as will be shown below, the effect of 
wc  is more subtle than that. 
To understand the role of 
wc , two types of changes should be considered, a marginal change, or a significant one. 
The former would impact the percentage of certain types of users who choose one platform but would not change 
the equilibrium situation qualitatively as classified in previous sections, while the latter may cause the equilibrium to 
change from one scenario to another. Both types are discussed below. 
We first investigate the effect of a marginal increase of 
wc . In the case of high contribution value, where all HL 
users choose the NQ platform, if LH users initially have lower cost (i.e. ))(( LHLHLw qqvc −−<− θθ ), then when 
)ˆ,0( 2
HL
SS∈ , a marginal increase in wc  reduces the number of LH users who contribute in the NQ platform, while 
when HLSS 2
ˆ> , such a marginal increase has no effect because wc  does not enter the equations that characterize the 
equilibrium. If initially HH users have lower cost, then when )ˆ,0( 1
HHSS∈ , a marginal increase in wc  does not 
impact the resulting user composition, as it does not enter the equilibrium equation; when )ˆ,ˆ( 221
HHHH
SSS∈ , such a 
marginal increase reduces the percentage of LH and HH users who choose the NQ platform; and when HHSS 22
ˆ> , a 
marginal increase again has no additional impact because 
wc  drops out of the equilibrium equation. Generally, in the 
case of high contribution value, a marginal increase in 
wc  will either reduce the number of users who choose NQ 
platform or have no effect. The intuition that higher 
wc  benefits the Q platform indeed holds. 
In the case of low contribution value, where all HL users choose the Q platform initially, if LH users initially have 
lower cost (i.e. 
HWHLHLw cvvc θθθ /))(( −−<− ), then when )ˆ,0( 2
LL
SS∈ , a marginal increase in wc  reduces the 
number of LH users who contribute in the NQ platform; when LLSS 2
ˆ> , however, a marginal increase in wc actually 
increases the number of LH users who choose the NQ platform. Similarly, if HH users initially have lower cost, 
when )ˆ,0( 1
LH
SS ∈ , a marginal increase in wc  increases the number of HH users who choose the NQ platform; when 
)ˆ,ˆ( 21
LHLH
SSS ∈ , such an increase reduces the combined number of LH and HH users who choose the NQ platform 
but still increases the number of HH users who do so (a reverse crowding out effect); when )ˆ,ˆ( 222
LHLH
SSS ∈ , a 
marginal increase in 
wc  reduces the number of LH users who choose the NQ platform; yet when 
LH
SS 22
ˆ> , such a 
marginal increase again increases the number of LH users who choose the NQ platform. As we can see, in the case 
of low contribution value, a marginal increase in 
wc  can in many situations increase the number of LH and HH users 
in the NQ platform. This may at first look counterintuitive. However, we should note that in the case of low 
contribution value, the group of HL users is divided between the two platforms in equilibrium, so that the difference 
in content quality between the platforms is exactly compensated by the net intrinsic contribution value for the high 
valuation users. As the value of 
wc  increases, the net intrinsic contribution value decreases. This also reduces the 
difference in content quality and in turn attracts more LH and HH users to the NQ platform. Certainly a higher value 
of 
wc  may reduce the number of HL users in NQ platform at the same time as more LH and HH users, but the net 
result can still be beneficial to the NQ platform.  
 Ma et. al. / Quality Control and UGC Monetization 
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We next look at the effect of a significant change in 
wc , which may change the equilibrium scenario. The cases are 
rather easy to see. First, a significant increase in 
wc  may change the situation from that of high contribution value to 
low contribution value, making HL users who may otherwise choose the NQ platform choose the Q platform instead. 
Such a change would certainly benefit the Q platform. On the other hand, if an increase in 
wc  is not significant 
enough to change this, but is enough to make LH users more expensive than HH users, then such a change could 
actually benefit the NQ platform, especially when reward value is low, as HH users instead of  LH users will choose 
the NQ platform. The different effects of 
wc  in various scenarios, some of which surprising at first look, call for 
considerable precaution of UGC business practitioners. 
Discussion And Conclusion 
User-generated-content (UGC) based business is rapidly growing in industry, reaching virtually every corner of the 
Internet and changing the competitive landscape. The success of a UGC business depends on attracting a user base 
that is both large and composed of those with genuine interest in the content and related products. Attracting a large 
user base is not easy but many firms have managed to do so. Attracting the right users and successfully monetizing 
from it, however, has proven to be a daunting challenge to industry practitioners.  
Academic research on UGC is in its early phase. Existing research on open-source software and online reputation 
systems sheds light on several aspects of the UGC phenomenon due to the close proximity. However, research on 
open-source and reputation systems focuses on improving the quality of the end product generated by users, instead 
of analyzing user participation itself. Our study is among the first attempts to fill this gap, by addressing this central 
question of attracting the right users, which is the key to successful monetization. 
The defining characteristic of a UGC platform is that users are also contributors. Whereas allowing more users to 
contribute may reduce the overall content quality of the platform, restricting the contribution by performing quality 
control may take away from many users the potential benefit that can be derived from contributing content and drive 
them away to competitors. 
We focus in this study on the tradeoff between content quality and the freedom to contribute. By studying two UGC 
platforms with different policies in competition, one allowing anyone to contribute while the other permitting only 
high quality contents, we characterize the equilibrium under various situations. Factors such as difference in user 
valuation, difference in content quality, cost of contribution, and magnitude of reward value are incorporated in our 
analysis. Our study shows that different types of users will respond to various incentives to different degrees, and 
that their decisions influence one another as well. We show that higher reward value generally benefit the platform 
that does not control content quality, due to the higher per person reward value it implies, that the key determinant 
of the equilibrium is the relative cost of users who have low valuation and those with high valuation, and that 
because the relative cost of users change as the reward value changes, under certain situation higher reward value 
will bring more low valuation users to the platform without quality control while at the same time drive the high 
valuation users out, thus benefiting the other platform that controls quality. We also analyze how cost of 
contribution influence the equilibrium, and find that though higher cost of contribution is generally detrimental to 
the platform without quality control, it can also help that platform under certain circumstances, again because the 
change in relative cost of different types of users.  
As one of the first attempts to address the unique nature of UGC and its effect on firm profit, our study has a few 
limitations which call for future work. First, firms may differ in their reward values and their costs of contribution. 
The asymmetric scenario can be analyzed to shed light on the effect of other decisions in addition to quality control. 
Alternative reward mechanisms, especially individual-specific ones, may also be considered. Second, quality can 
have a horizontal dimension as well as the vertical one addressed in our study. This horizontal dimension may 
represent the difference in taste among users and could be included in the model. In this case, the quantity of 
information would also be considered when users choose the platform, since higher quantity increases the likelihood 
of a user finding content close to her taste. Third, positive network externalities may exist and may be of interest for 
investigation. Finally, content quality may be a continuous dimension instead of the somewhat simplified binary 
classification in our study. Extending the model to account for continuous quality can help answer another important 
question, namely how strict firms should perform quality control. With the rapid growth of user-generated-content in 
industry, further research is needed to help understand this important phenomenon. 
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